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I will talk tonight about recent developments in the automobile industry with respect to
competitive advantage, particularly as these relate to capacity expansion at an unprecedented rate.
Worldwide Explosion in Production Capacity
Worldwide vehicle production ability is growing today more rapidly than it has in the last 20
or 30 years, and this has interesting implications for the world’s auto makers.  Clearly most
automobile manufacturers are very optimistic about the willingness of consumers to buy up this
capacity.  While environmental issues exist, they are not being factored into investment decisions
about increases in car production capacity.  At present, the world has the capability of producing 15
to 20 million more vehicles than it is currently buying (approximately 56 million passenger cars and
light trucks annually).
This growth in capacity is occurring primarily in the underdeveloped and developing nations.
In particular, until recently, the East Asian Tigers have been growth markets for many consumer
products including automobiles.  Th e markets – Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia – are dominated by
Japanese automobile companies which effectively control 80 percent of the market in Asia.  American
and European manufacturers look to this region as the market of the future.  Ford, General Motors
(GM) and, to a lesser extent, Chrysler are now making investment decisions in this part of the world.
In terms of the number of cars per thousand people, these markets are the least mature in the world.
Whereas in the United States there is one motor vehicle for every licensed driver, in some of th
developing world it is a tenth or twentieth of that level.
But this market has changed abruptly from the euphoria of February when everyone was
predicting the record-setting potential of the Thai market this year.  Projections for Thailand are now
2down 40 percent or more for the year, indicating how fast and deep the market has fallen.  Nissan and
Volvo have closed their factories temporarily, and both Toyota and Honda are operating on a one-
or two-day schedule.  The Ford Motor Company has a brand new Thai plant, but how soon it ramps
up is an open question.
Of course, these companies are looking at not only the market potential where their
manufacturing capacity is located, but at the possibility for additional export growth.  Ford plans to
build pickup trucks in Thailand, the third largest pickup truck market in the world, and export them
to other countries.  GM is also opening a factory in Thailand next year and plans to export to other
countries as well.  However, Thailand is actually a high cost production source because more parts
are imported.
There is also an enormous amount of capacity growth in Latin America where the opposite
situation is occurring.  The two major markets in that region, Brazil and Argentina, are dominated
by American and European m ufacturers, namely Fiat, Volkswagen, and GM, although the order
is periodically reshuffled.  In these protected markets, the dominant market players have been in
business for 30 or 40 years.  Other markets, such as Peru, Ecuador and Chile, are more open, with
many Korean companies participating.  However, new efforts by Brazil to lower import duties and
establish a quota system have enabled other companies to set up factories th re.  Brazil s now viewed
as a very exciting growth market for the future.  Of course, none of the European or American
companies want to give up their positions to newcomers, so again production capacity is increasing
on an unprecedented scale.  Some 40 billion dollars of new capacity (more than a million units) are
going into Brazil alone.
With regard to other parts of the world, Korea alone plans to add some 3 million units of
announced capacity between now and the year 2000.  Whether or not that actually occurs, especially
given the serious financial problems of some Korean companies, remains to be seen, but this
represents one of the largest single pieces of capacity coming on line in the ext few years.  China also
has tremendous aspir tions of being a formidable player in the world motor vehicle market, not just
for serving the Chinese home market but also for exporting vehicles from China.  With its relatively
low labor costs, China hopes to take over much of the motor vehicle export market from the Asian
Tigers, just as it has done with other products such as textiles.
3Why is the world so interested in motor vehicles?  It is because of the wealth creation effect
of this industry, and the profound importance for the industrial development of a country of what it
means to be able to build a car.  There is no other product that embodies as much technology as an
automobile -- it is electronics, rubber, glass, plastics, teel, and aluminum; it is every conceivable way
of bending or shaping or forming metal; it is robotics, automation, and machine tools; it is the need
for a highly-skilled workforce; it is 8,000 to 10,000 parts (depending on the kind of car) coming
together in an assembly line which coordinates the skill of many different people and supplier
companies.  The country that can create an automobile from scratch is a country that has a
tremendous industrial infrastructure.  That is why a car is important.  A car is less important in it
ability to take you from place to place, and more important in that it creates employment and
encourages development of an industrial base.
Adjusting to Adversity: The U.S. and Japanese Industries in Comparison
The last four years have been extraordinary for U.S. auto companies, earning them every year
between 13 and 14 billion dollars.  This is not bad financial performance for an industry that was
viewed as dead in 1990, when both GM and Chrysler were on the verge of filing bankruptcy.  This
year again will be an outstanding year both for Ford and GM.
In examining how the Japanese and U.S. auto industries have changed and adjusted to
adversity, we find that the turnaround of the Japanese industry has had more to do with the value of
the currency than it has had to do with fundamental change for several companies.  While Japanese
automobile companies have suffered fairly staggering losses over the last few years, both 1996 and
1997 showed improvement because of the stronger dollar.
What happened to Japanese manufacturers during the bubble economy?  First, all had huge,
very unrealistic expectations about where the Japanese market was going.  Japan is as saturated with
motor vehicles as the United States, and yet during the last 1980s virtually every Japanese automaker
built another factory to expand capacity and maintain market share.  Companies rationalized this
massive increase in capacity by believing that somehow their company’s market share would grow
and another company’s market share would shrink.  But that theory works only if there are other
companies around willing to give up market share.  This, of course, is no longer the case; the world
4has changed and it has changed very dramatically.
In the case of the U.S. industry, however, substantial fundamental changes have occurred
within the automobile companies themselves, allowing them to reduce excess capacity and in the
process adjust their break-even points.  Over the last decade and a half, for example, GM has closed
enough capacity to equal a company the size of Chrysler, essentially transferring it to the Japanese
during the 1980s.  GM was such a giant that it took a long ime before the company even understood
that its failure to respond to problems of cost structure and product was causing it to permanently
lose market share (from 35 percent in 1989 to 31.8 percent today).  Chrysler and Ford have also
reduced large amounts of excess capacity.
Distinguishing Between Winners and Losers
Will every automobile company be successful in achieving its goals?  Absolutely not.  As we
look at this explosion in production capacity, the real question is which companies will actually make
money.  From an economic standpoint, this industry is extremely capital intensive, and this is why
capacity and capacity utilization are so important.  There are enormous fixed costs associated with
automobile assembly.  GM, for example, is now putting in five factories around the world, which will
give the company an incremental capacity of close to one million vehicles.  The total investment for
those factories is between 3 and 5 billion dollars, not includi g engine or parts plants.  These gigantic
investments with huge fixed costs are what motivate manufacturers to build because the only way to
recover that investment is to produce.  This is an industry, therefore, with high break-even points.
From the economic standpoint, it is also a cyclical industry.  Consumers buy cars when they
can afford to buy cars, but the fixed costs for manufacturers stay fairly high.  This is the reason why
profits in the industry go from feast to famine.  The automobile is essentially a commodity product
in an industry that is capital intensive, and certainly this presents problems as the industry expands.
What constituted competitive advantage in the 1980s is changing, and parity is being achieved
acros the major producers around the world.  This is the process that is turning cars into
commodities, and what is forcing fundamental adjustments in automobile companies.  While there
used to be 15 to 20 defects per North American built car and one defect per Japanese car, today in
the JD power survey of American-made cars, quality is at par with that of Japanese cars in 1992.
5Clearly, there are no longer huge differences in quality but small differences in degrees of perfection.
In terms of productivity in the factory, the Japanese understood as early as the 1950s and
1960s how to get maximum efficiency out of their assets -- whether it was people, machinery or floor
space.  Americans did not figure it out until MIT and others studied Japanese methods and wrote
books such as The Machine that Changed the World.  Then U.S. manufacturers suddenly realized
that factory productivity had a lot to do with the way people were trained, machines were maintained,
work was laid out, and vehicles were engin ered and designed, that how many hours it took to build
a car depended upon how many parts there were in the car and how hard they were to put together.
Now that particular genie is out of the bottle, and though not every American assembly plant is at the
Toyoda-plant level, with every new model year and every new product, the factory efficiency gap
narrows.  Where GM previously spent 33 man-hours building a mid-size car, today’s new crop of
mid-size cars from GM takes about 22 man-hours to produce.  Although still not as good as an
Accord which can be built in 17 to 18 man-hours, this is close enough to make the differences not
so important.
Japanese also have benefitted from very close relationships with suppliers.  In fact, they were
able to get new cars on the market every four years, mainly because their suppliers were linked to the
automobile company in familial relationships that entrusted the supplier to do a great deal of the
engineering work for the manufacturer.  In effect, the Japanese shifted a lot of their fixed costs onto
their suppliers and became variable cost assemblers.  That has been hard to replicate outside Japan
because U.S. automobile companies were very highly vertically integrated.  But companies such as
GM and Ford are no longer as vertically integrated.  Almost monthly an announcement is made of
yet another division being closed or sold.  About two weeks ago, for example, GM announced the
sale of three major divisions in its Delphi parts busines , amounting to two billion dollars of revenues
generated entirely within GM.  The company is getting rid of this business, pushing the engineering
responsib lities onto their suppliers.  They, too, are looking to turn themselves into variable cost
companies that have a different ratio of variable-to-fixed costs.  There is one U.S. supplier of seats
and interior systems that has 80 percent variable costs and 20 percent fixed, which is probably the
epitome of a company that has shifted costs right down the supply chain.  In sum, supplier
relationships in the United States are firming up and look very much like the tier structure in Japan.
6Parts manufacturers now have specific expertise and technical capability to absorb engineering work
from the auto companies.  As a result, companies are now looking to five-year product cycles.
Suddenly what factors things that have distinguished Japanese auto manufacturers in the past
and enabled them to gain market share are being matched by U.S. and European companies.  So what
constitutes competitive advantage?  For a long time the Japanese were able to offset their excess
capacity at home with higher exports throughout the world but that export potential is no longer
there, especially with regard to the developed markets of North America and Western Europe.  And
in most markets of the developing world, the growth of home auto industries has hampered the ability
of Japanese manufacturers to shif  surplus capacity away from Japan.  Even though exports are up
substantially this year because of the weak yen, they are no where near the levels of a few years ago
and certainly not high enough to absorb the excess capacity.  On top of this, the Japanese are
suffering from a decline in home market demand, especially following the April 1 consumption tax
increase.
How has Japan responded to this crisis of excess capacity?  U.S. companies just shut down
factories, but in Japan only the Nissan Zama factory has been closed.  Other factories have been
temporarily shut down or are now operating on  single shift basis.  Consequently, there is no longer
overtime for Japanese autoworkers who have become accustomed to this component of their pay in
order to meet their standard of living.  Equally important, Japan is still saddled with excess capacity
(measured by various sources to be in the range of 3 to 4 million units).  This translates to higher
fixed cost  for the industry and is one of the reasons it has been struggling to rebuild itself after the
effects of the bubble economy.  Certainly none of the Japanese automakers has been able to adjust
as quickly to its domestic structural problems as has either Chrysler or GM.  As a result, they can no
longer export to the rest of the world.
At the same time, other profound changes are occurring.  The American consumer no longer
thinks all Japanese cars are created equal.  The September sales picture shows that while Toyota sales
were down because of lack of availability (Toyota is carrying the burden for the Japanese industry
and only moderately increasing its exports to the United States), Honda sales were up due to
increased imports from Japan.  Also Nissan, Mazda, and Suzuki sales were down, while Mitsubishi
sales were flat.  So despite the strong dollar, Japanese automakers have not gained market share
7widely this year.  American consumers have begun to see parity on the previously important
distinguishing factors such as price and quality.
U.S. auto manufacturers have also had some lucky breaks having very little to do with their
own actions to lower break-even points.  One was that the American consumer fell in love with light
trucks, and the Japanese do not sell many light trucks.  Second, Americans like the b ggest of the light
trucks, which is where the heart of industry profits are.
Developments in the U.S. light-weight truck market serve as an interesting microcosm for
what we might expect in a world faced with a huge capacity glut.  First, he light-truck market caught
U.S. manufacturers by surprise, and it took them a long time to adjust to the fact that this new
demand was not a fad.  In 1992 light-weight truck sales in the United Sta es wer  roughly 4.6 million.
This year they will be about 6.8 million.  Capacity to build light trucks has been slightly less than the
demand for these vehicl s for the last five years.  Consequently, manufacturers who sell light trucks
in this market have been able to increase prices each year.  In 1988 about 51 percent of American
households could afford the average truck, whereas today only 40 percent can.  This is because the
price of the truck has gone up so much.  Now most companies are conv nced they can bring out a
slightly different or better light truck and some 800,000 new units of light truck capacity are coming
to the market.  Companies are converting car and heavy-duty commercial truck plants to build light
trucks.  On top of that, Mercedes Benz is now building all-activity vehicles; Toyota has launched
60,000 units of minivan productions and will begin importing Lexus sport utility vehicles; and Honda
will go into production next year with a minivan sport utility vehicle.  The market has suddenly
become very crowded, and the pricing power that the industry once had to generate these
astronomical profits is about to disappear.  And much the same can be said for other segments
throughout the world because of the capacity buildup.
What are the implications?  In the United States it is massive price deflation; new car prices
will not go up.  Since auto companies have reached parity, product life cycles have been reduced to
four or five years, and product development can take as little as 24 months.  Quality is the same since
engineering advances can be quickly replicated.
So how does a company find competitive advantage?  The answer for many has been to go
global.  As a result, pricing pressure will make it difficult to achieve the returns on investment they
8had  initially planned.  The growth of the Korean industry into an automotive superpower has not
occurred on a particularly solid financial base, for example.  Is the Korean auto industry going to be
able to perform in terms of capacity and sales to the extent projected?  Is there a worldwide market
for their vehicles?  Korean manufacturers currently are s lling cars on the basis of low price.  It is yet
to be tested whether ose cars can sell at a price that generates a return on investment.  Eventually
there will be a worldwide shake out, and it is only the financially strong, globally competitive
companies which will survive.  This is no longer an industry defined by the country; it is now a
industry defined by the company.
What will be the new factors separating the winners and losers?  First will be lower costs, and
on a standard-setting scale of 20, 30, or 40 percent reductions per year.  There are component
manufacturers today that are achieving cost reduction on a double-digit scale year after year so the
assemblers ought to be able to do it too.  Second, all companies will look for the niche product which
will light the consumer’s heart on fire.  Herein lies their greatest opportunity to control pricing.  And
the third factor driving production differentiation will be technology.  Ultimately, however, the real
winners in the game will be those companies that understand how to maximize their returns on assets.
This is the standard by which the U.S. industry is now being managed, and this will be what
distinguishes future winners and losers around the world.
